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Abstract
This article examines international evidence for the benefits of 
decentralisation based on new information published recently by the 
OECD. It finds benefits from decentralisation, but notes that whether 
these are realised or not is influenced by the nature of the multi-level 
governance framework. The applicability of decentralisation to New 
Zealand is also considered.
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Examining  
the Case for 
Decentralisation
Internationally, decentralisation, and the broader concepts of localism and subsidiarity, are in fashion. Actively 
promoted by organisations ranging from 
the OECD and World Bank to think 
tanks such as the New Local Government 
Network in Britain and the Brookings 
Institution in the US (Katz and Nowak, 
2016), a decentralisation discourse is 
also emerging in New Zealand (see Local 
Government New Zealand, 2018; Craven, 
Goldingham-Newsom and Hartwich, 2019).
This article examines the case for 
decentralisation drawing on data published 
by the OECD and United Cities and Local 
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Centralization deadens every feeling of generous emulation; destroys every 
incentive to effort at improvement; and damps every ardour for the progressive 
development of resources. Instead of a stimulus being given to enterprise 
and to talent … the theories and the crotchets of one or two individuals are 
imposed as compulsory law; and every suggestion, however excellent, which 
does not conform to such theories and crotchets, is absolutely forbidden. 
(J.T. Smith, Self-government and Centralization, 1851, p.60,  
quoted in Chandler, 2008, pp.357–8)
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Governments in 2016 and asks whether the 
findings are applicable to New Zealand 
(OECD, 2016). It frames the concept of 
decentralisation as the transfer of authority 
and responsibility for public functions 
from a central government to subnational 
governments, regional and local, within its 
jurisdiction through primarily delegation 
or devolution (Shah and Thompson, 2004; 
OECD, 2017;  Smoke, 2017) . 
Decentralisation has three dimensions, 
political, administrative and fiscal:
•	 Political	 decentralisation	 involves	 
the redistribution of powers and 
responsibilities through, for example, 
delegation or devolution, often in 
accordance with the subsidiarity 
principle (Smoke, 2017). It also 
includes measures to enhance 
democratic legitimacy, such as free 
elections and a constitutional/legal 
status for local governments, and 
enable voice and exit.1 
•	 Administrative	decentralisation	ensures	
that local authorities have the authority 
to manage their own administrations 
and staff within the law and the 
freedom to enter into contracts. It is 
also measured by the ability to establish 
by-laws to regulate local matters 
without seeking permission from 
higher-level authorities. 
•	 Fiscal	 decentralisation	 concerns	
whether or not local governments have 
revenue autonomy and adequacy, 
expenditure autonomy and the freedom 
to borrow without seeking permission 
from higher authorities (see OECD 
2016).
For	 the	 purposes	 of	 the	 article,	
decentralisation is calculated by the share 
of total public expenditure which is 
allocated by subnational government (i.e. 
spending decentralisation), a measure that 
acts as a proxy for the range of powers and 
responsibilities held by each system. As a 
measure it contains a number limitations, 
the most significant being its failure to 
reflect levels of fiscal autonomy: that is, the 
level of discretion councils have to allocate 
revenue to address local priorities (see Reid, 
2015). Discretion varies according to 
revenue sources; own-sourced revenues, 
such as local taxes, are generally associated 
with high levels of autonomy. The same 
tends to be true with general purpose 
grants but not with tied grants: these are 
tagged for a specific purpose and tend to 
allow little discretion. 
Despite the diversity of revenue sources 
– that is, the combination of taxes, grants, 
etc. – internationally, more positive 
economic, social and democratic outcomes 
appear to be correlated with higher levels 
of public expenditure allocated by 
subnational government:
There seems to be a positive correlation 
between the level of spending on 
decentralisation measured by the share 
in	GDP,	or	in	public	spending,	and	the	
development level of the countries, 
measured	 by	 the	 GDP	 per	 capita.	
(OECD, 2016, p.23)
The OECD also notes, however, that 
decentralisation is no panacea for the 
problems faced by countries. Of equal 
importance are how the process is designed 
and implemented, the degree of maturity 
of country institutions, adequate 
subnational capacities, and the quality of 
multi-level governance, including 
coordination mechanisms (ibid.). 
The economic case
In early 2012, facing a recession and 
rising unemployment, David Cameron, 
the then UK prime minister, asked Lord 
Heseltine, a former Conservative cabinet 
minister, to review his government’s 
economic development strategy and 
offer bold solutions. Heseltine’s report, 
No Stone Unturned (2012), contained 
one overarching message: that increasing 
centralism was bad for business. He was 
particularly critical of the way successive 
governments had reduced the role of local 
government to that of a service provider, 
undermining the leadership role councils 
had previously played in economic 
matters. Heseltine’s intuition appears to 
be justified. The international evidence 
indicates that per capita gross domestic 
product is higher in fiscally decentralised 
countries than in centralised ones (see 
Figure	1).
Despite the existence of outliers, such 
as the Republic of Ireland, which benefits 
from its low tax status for large tech firms, 
and Norway, with its oil wealth, the general 
pattern	within	the	OECD	is	for	GDP	to	be	
higher in countries that are fiscally 
decentralised. The relationship is further 
reinforced by a World Bank study which 
found that economic activity is stronger in 
those countries where local governments 
have high levels of political autonomy and 
tax and revenue assignment (fiscal 
decentralisation). Blöchliger (2013) 
estimated that a 10% increase in the level 
of decentralisation is associated with an 
average	increase	in	per	capita	GDP	of	3%.	
He also concluded that a 1% increase in 
the decentralisation ratio has a similar 
effect	on	GDP	as	a	1%	reduction	in	tax.
Economic arguments for decentralisa-
tion often draw on the theory of fiscal 
federalism and the allocative efficiency 
advantages of locating decisions on services 
with governments that are close to the 
Figure 1: Relationship between levels of decentralisation and GDP
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citizens that use or benefit from those 
services. In summary these are:
•	 decentralisation	enhances	voice	and	
exit, thereby reducing the economic 
cost of under- or over-provision of 
local public goods (see Bailey, 1999; 
Oates, 1999);
•	 placing	decision	making	about	local	
services close to the citizens who receive 
the services addresses the problem of 
information asymmetry faced by 
higher-level governments;
•	 aligning	the	beneficiaries	of	services	
with those who pay reduces the risk of 
externalities and spillovers that result 
in allocative inefficiency;
•	 fiscal	 decentralisation	 enables	
municipal entrepreneurialism (Katz 
and Nowak, 2016). 
The democratic case
The current state of democracy has been 
the subject of considerable scholarship, 
with a growing number of commentators 
arguing that the world is experiencing a 
democracy recession characterised not 
only by declining trust in democratic 
institutions but also by the rise of a new 
form of populism, with authoritarian 
leaders who, once in power, use their new 
positions to subvert the same democracy 
that enabled them to gain office in the 
first place (Grayling, 2017; Economist 
Intelligence	 Unit,	 2017).	 Feelings	 of	
disempowerment, especially in regions 
experiencing economic decline, are not 
a new phenomenon. Writing in 1996, 
Michael Novak noted how the belief that 
community problems could be solved at 
the local level lost favour as public affairs 
were gradually removed from the reach of 
citizens. He blamed the growth of at-large 
citywide systems of political representation 
in the United States, which, by the end of 
the 20th century, had ‘handed governance 
to corporate and professional elites [who] 
possessed a scientific and rational view of 
governance’ (Novak, 1996, p.16). While 
the powers of ward-based councillors 
are very different, New Zealand has also 
experienced a growth in at-large systems 
of political representation at the local level.
At issue is the question of how citizens 
learn about democracy and what seems to 
be important is the practice, not just voting 
in national elections but, more importantly, 
participating in the political arenas that 
affect them directly.2 
The importance of participation is not 
limited to strengthening democratic values; 
participation also contributes to levels of 
social capital. Social capital is a way of 
describing the stock of informal norms and 
values in a community, particularly 
reciprocity and connectivity, which 
enhance cooperation and social cohesion 
(Putnam,	 1995).	 In	 this	 context	
decentralisation provides avenues for 
participation that cannot be achieved at a 
national level alone, and we see a positive 
correlation between citizen participation 
in clubs and associations and levels of fiscal 
decentralisation	(see	Figure	2).
Further	 evidence	 of	 the	 benefits	 of	
political participation comes from a study 
of Swiss cantons. Cantons with higher 
levels of sub-municipal autonomy and 
active forms of direct democracy, such as 
referenda, had higher levels of self-reported 
individual well-being compared to cantons 
that had less autonomy and fewer 
opportunities for local political 
participation.
Using recent interview data from 6,000 
residents of Switzerland, we show that 
individuals are cet. par. happier, the 
better developed the institutions of 
direct democracy are in their area of 
residence. This also applies to a second 
institution, the degree of government 
decentralisation	(federalism).	(Frey	and	
Stutzer, 2000, p.2)
Given the arguments in support of 
decentralisation, and related narratives like 
localism and subsidiarity, and the degree 
to which these concepts dominate 
international local government reform (see 
OECD, 2016), it is reasonable to ask why 
they have received so little attention during 
three decades of local government and 
public sector reform in New Zealand. 
Relevance to New Zealand 
While New Zealanders may not feel they 
live in a highly centralised state, the reality 
is quite different. In 2009 the Economist, 
referring to the work of think tanks such 
as the New Local Government Network to 
promote decentralisation, noted that the 
United Kingdom was the most centralised 
country in the OECD except for New 
Zealand (Economist, 2009). While levels 
of decentralisation tend to vary over 
time,	as	Figure	3	illustrates,	as	far	as	fiscal	
decentralisation goes we sit firmly towards 
the bottom of the table.
The most decentralised countries tend 
to be federations, such as Canada and 
Switzerland; however, Denmark, a unitary 
country, stands out as the second-most 
fiscally decentralised state in the OECD. 
New Zealand, at 11.26%, sits at the fiscally 
centralised end of the spectrum as part of 
a group of countries that includes Greece, 
the Republic of Ireland and Israel. 
Although it is not well recognised in our 
social and political histories, New Zealand 
has not always been as fiscally centralised 
as it is today, as exemplified by the 
Figure 2: Decentralisation and participation
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commentary on the Municipal 
Corporations Act 1842, our first local 
government statute. The statute (which was 
very short lived and replaced in 1852) 
reflected a commitment to local autonomy 
and the self-management of local affairs 
which is as relevant today as it was then: 
the inhabitants themselves are best 
qualified … to provide for the wants 
and needs of their respective settlements 
… thus entrusted with the unfettered 
management of their own local affairs 
every settlement would be more or less 
attractive to trade, capital, and 
commerce. (New Zealand Journal, 1842, 
quoted in Craven, Goldingham-
Newsom and Hartwich, 2019, p.8)
Despite the optimism of the legislators 
in 1842, municipal autonomy has always 
been a contested space, as regular 
complaints about rampant centralisation 
from local government leaders testifies, 
although ministers also had concerns about 
council performance (Bush, 1980). 
Speaking at a course on careers in local 
government for ex-servicemen in 1949, the 
then	minister	of	internal	affairs,	W.E.	Parry,	
in response to demands that councils be 
given broader roles and powers had this to 
say: ‘additional responsibilities [do] not 
harmonise with the unwillingness to accept, 
on the part of many local authorities, the 
responsibilities which they have at the 
present time’ (Stephens, 1949, p.v).5 
The minister’s view that new 
responsibilities might distract councils 
from performing their existing roles was 
clearly not an isolated one. Sixty years later 
one of his successors, Rodney Hide, who 
was clearly driven by similar concerns, 
amended the Local Government Act 2002 
to prescribe a list of ‘core services’ that 
councils should have regard to (s11A). 
The question of local government’s role 
was also the subject of a number of papers 
in the 1980s, a period in which the New 
Zealand state was undergoing major 
reform. The first, published by the New 
Zealand	Planning	Council,	asked	whether	
central government’s attitude to local 
government reflected a partnership or was 
simply paternalistic (Sowman, 1984). The 
report found no evidence of a partnership 
but did make useful recommendations 
about how one might work, including 
criteria for the allocation of public services. 
A second paper, by Jonathan Boston, was 
prepared	 for	 the	 Institute	 of	 Public	
Administration in 1988. In that paper 
Boston, having examined the arguments in 
favour of decentralisation, turned his 
attention to the degree to which they had 
utility for New Zealand. His conclusion was 
that they didn’t, for at least seven quite 
significant reasons, which are set out below. 
Given that quite a lot has changed over the 
last 30 years, it is reasonable to check 
whether Boston’s reservations still apply.
The lack of citizen interest in local 
government as illustrated by low voter 
turnout
Although average voter turnout in local 
elections has declined by almost 20% over 
this period (general election turnout has 
also declined, but by less), the argument 
is ultimately circular as turnout in 
local elections is highly correlated with 
the system’s level of salience. Salience 
describes the degree to which a system of 
local government is seen as relevant to the 
lives of citizens and is often assessed on 
the basis of local taxation or expenditure 
levels or decentralisation (see Reid, 2016; 
Rallings and Thrasher, 2007).6	 Figure	
4 shows a positive correlation between 
decentralisation (salience) and voter 
turnout in local government elections. 
In relation to salience, the most useful 
example is that of Switzerland, one of the 
world’s most decentralised countries. 
Reflecting that country’s high level of 
decentralisation, voter turnout is 
consistently higher in local elections 
Figure 3:  Decentralisation among OECD members4
Source: OECD, 2016
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(municipality and canton) than federal 
elections (Reid, 2016).
The capacity of citizens to play a meaningful 
role in the increasingly complex and 
specialised task of policymaking that modern 
democracies require
The view that the complexity of modern 
societies requires the skill and talent of a 
cadre of highly qualified experts to govern 
has well and truly begun to lose traction. 
Evidence is growing of citizens having a 
more direct involvement in the business 
of governing, from the citizens’ assemblies 
used in Iceland and the Republic of Ireland 
to the growth of deliberative democracy 
as exemplified recently by New York City’s 
adoption of participatory budgeting 
(Harkins and Egan, 2012).8 In addition, 
participatory approaches to decision 
making are increasingly used by both 
central and local government in New 
Zealand: for example, the post-earthquake 
reconstruction of Christchurch. 
Most of all, citizen trust in the role of 
experts has been undermined by the failure 
of the current economic order to deliver 
fair outcomes, with the global financial 
crisis and growth in regional inequality 
resulting in the rise of populist 
authoritarian movements and decisions 
such as Brexit (Grayling, 2017). 
The lack of evidence that dispersing power 
actually enhances liberal democratic values
The counterfactual to dispersing power 
is its concentration. Despite the value 
of	MMP	the	New	Zealand	model,	given	
the power held by a small number of 
political actors in cabinet, depends 
to a high degree on the democratic 
propensity of those actors. While we 
have generally been privileged by the 
quality of our leadership, the degree to 
which power is concentrated is a risk, 
as noted in the 1960s by John Roberts, 
then professor of public administration 
at Victoria University, who saw ‘an 
effective local government structure is an 
important counterweight to the growth 
of central government power’ (Roberts 
and Sidebotham, 1968, p.1). In the last 
three decades we have also come to better 
understand the role of active citizenship 
and its value to a strong democracy; as 
Michael Sandel wrote, ‘the formative 
aspect of republican politics requires 
public spaces that gather citizens 
together, enable them to interpret their 
condition, and cultivate solidarity and 
civic engagement’ (Sandel, 1996, p.349). 
Sandel also argues that contemporary 
issues make the politics of neighbourhoods 
more important, as they not only constitute 
sites of civic activity and political power, 
they also equip citizens for self-rule, a 
pluralism that calls into question the 
wisdom of concentrating power. 
The susceptibility of local governments to 
‘capture’ by vested interests
Noting that the term ‘capture’ tends 
to be applied by groups who find that 
their particular preferences have been 
overlooked by the majority of voters, 
one of the strongest arguments for 
decentralisation is in fact the inability 
of vested interests to ‘capture’ local 
government, unlike the risks posed 
by New Zealand’s relatively unfettered 
form of central government. Relevant 
considerations are:
•	 New	Zealand	voters	tend	to	support	
candidates who stand on platforms that 
are ‘place’ rather than ‘policy’ centred 
and organised political party platforms 
tend to do poorly; 
•	 even	if	a	‘capture’	scenario	was	to	occur,	
turnover at the local level is high, with 
on average 35% of local politicians 
changing with each triennial election;
•	 should	 groups	 with	 a	 single	 policy	
platform win a majority in a council, 
their ability to impose it without a 
significant level of support from 
citizens is very constrained given the 
legislative and constitutional checks 
and balances that apply to local 
government. 
Recognised concerns about the 
accountability, effectiveness and efficient 
management of local authorities
Capacity in local government is often 
associated with size. Since 1988 local 
government has gone through extensive 
reforms that have addressed the 
fragmentation problems, strengthened 
managerial and administrative capability 
and introduced a new accountability 
framework. The average size of a council 
jurisdiction in New Zealand, excluding 
Auckland Council, is between 40,000 
and 50,000 residents, compared to 7,000 
in Europe and a similar number in the 
United States. Today there would be 
little or no difference in the competency 
and qualifications of management in an 
average-sized council and its equivalent-
sized government department.9 In addition, 
citizens trust local governments more than 
they trust central government; not only is 
this the case in New Zealand but also in 
the United States, the United Kingdom 
and	Australia	(Pew	Research	Center,	2018;	
IGPS	and	Colmar	Brunton,	2018).
Figure 4: Relationship between decentralisation and local voter turnout
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The relatively minor differences in culture 
and socio-economic status between localities 
and regions – in other words, the existence 
of homogeneous preferences for most public 
services
Since 1988 socio-economic differences 
between localities and regions have grown 
significantly (as has also occurred in the 
UK), representing perhaps one of the 
more damning failures of the centralised 
model.	The	average	per	capita	GDP	of	the	
three poorest regions in New Zealand is 
currently $41,000, compared with $67,500 
in our three most prosperous regions. 
High levels of spatial inequality are now 
seen to be directly related to high levels of 
centralisation (Bilsborough, 2018). 
Neither are regions and localities as 
ethnically and culturally homogeneous as 
they once were. The increasing 
heterogeneity of our towns, cities and 
regions requires a much more disaggregated 
approach to governance than the 
centralised model.
The quality and competence of local 
politicians and the difficulty of ensuring the 
advancement of national objectives should 
there be substantial devolution
While suggestions that there is a qualitative 
difference between national and local 
politicians should be contested, the level 
of skill and experience of local politicians 
is related to the mandate of our local 
government system – that is, the narrow 
range of tasks that councils presently 
undertake. A change in responsibilities 
will interest citizens with a different range 
of aptitudes and interests.
With regard to the achievement of 
national objectives, highly decentralised 
countries, such as those in Scandinavia, 
seem to have little problem with this issue 
and part of the answer concerns how 
governments think about strategy and how 
multi-level government relationships 
operate in practice. Successful strategy does 
not have to be a process steered by an elite 
group of officials and politicians whose 
decisions ‘cascade’ down to a diverse range 
of  organisations charged with 
implementation, as our failure to deal with 
chronic issues like child poverty and poor 
housing, despite multiple strategies, is 
testament to. Rather than the UK approach 
of narrowly defined targets with specific 
performance measures, national objectives 
may be more successfully achieved by 
defining outcomes or setting a broad vision 
that encourages innovation and diversity. 
The current coalition government’s focus 
on intergenerational well-being may in fact 
provide the basis of such a model.
Conclusion
Decentralisation is not a panacea for 
every ill that affects the public realm, 
but international experience suggests 
that there can be economic, democratic 
and social benefits. The challenge of 
getting there, however, should not be 
underestimated. As attractive as it sounds, 
‘big bang localism’ (Jenkins, 2004) can 
never be a political reality; change will 
need to occur incrementally, within the 
context of policy and activity reviews. 
There is no shortage of low-hanging fruit 
where more local discretion, through 
either devolution or a ‘right to influence’, 
could materially enhance community well-
being – for example:
•	 social	housing	–	councils	are	simply	
better placed than central government 
to assess local demand and develop 
innovative responses;
•	 education	–	schools	play	a	vital	role	in	
how communities work and are 
important hubs for multiple services. 
Their location, design and configuration 
should be sensitive to local needs and 
circumstances;
•	 services	to	older	citizens	–	these	should	
be located with local government rather 
than fragmented across district health 
boards and ministries, as is common in 
Australia. Enabling citizens to ‘age in 
place’ needs an holistic approach that 
is sensitive to community context, such 
as the mix of local service providers;
•	 financing	 instruments	 –	 local	
authorities’ ability to attract investment 
and growth is limited by the narrow 
range of funding and financing powers 
available.10 
There is no correct answer as to how 
these should be funded. Options range 
from local taxing powers and revenue 
sharing to general purpose grants. What is 
essential is that funding allows for local 
discretion and differentiation. In addition, 
attention needs to be given to the way in 
which intergovernmental processes work 
and how central government ‘steers’. 
Decentralisation should also been seen 
in the context of the current government’s 
desire to shift to a well-being orientation, 
as this is designed to drive a more joined-
up and less-siloed approach to public 
policy. Because of their focus on place and 
local knowledge, councils are in a strong 
position to shape public expenditure in 
their rohe and mobilise local organisations, 
such as iwi/Mäori, businesses and 
community groups, as well as citizens 
themselves, in order to identify local 
priorities and establish meaningful 
partnerships with government departments. 
Current signs are not that promising, with 
policy changes, such as those proposed for 
education, housing and water services, 
appearing to lack any serious consideration 
of decentralised options. 
Any strategy needs to be sensitive to the 
circumstances of our different communities. 
What Auckland needs to prosper and what 
it can undertake, given its capacity, is very 
different to a rural council’s in the South 
Island. If we are to move from our highly 
centralised model, whether through 
decentralisation or through opportunities 
that may be created by the government’s 
focus on intergenerational well-being, we 
need to accept that ‘one size fits all’ 
approaches to policy and government are 
no longer practical options.
1 See Bailey, 1999 for a discussion of the relevance of 
Hirschman’s work on voice, exit and loyalty to local 
government. ‘Exit’ in this context refers to an individual’s 
decision to move to another local government jurisdiction.
2 This is reflected in the Local Government Act 2002, 
where it states that the purpose of local government is to 
enable ‘democratic decision-making ... by, and on behalf of’ 
communities (s10).
3 https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/
images/1/1d/Social_participation_and_integration_LCIE18.
xlsx
4 OECD figures apply only to member countries with multi-
level government systems.
5 Concerns that local government’s role was gradually 
being diminished did not go away. Graham Bush notes 
that ‘the bogey of aggressive centralism’ was raised by the 
Municipal Association in the 1970s, along with complaints 
of government officials taking a ‘Wellington knows best’ 
attitude (Bush, 1980, p.112).
6 Local government taxes in New Zealand constitute 
approximately 2% of GDP, one of the lowest proportions in 
the OECD.
7 Local government turnout data collated by the author; it 
excludes federations and countries from the former East 
European bloc.
8 See https://www.innovations.harvard.edu/participatory-
budgeting-new-york-city.
9 When Boston was writing, the Local Government Official 
Information Act 1987, a cornerstone of local accountability, 
was barely a year old and would not yet have had much if 
any effect. 
10 The current government’s plan to create a centralised Urban 
Development Authority, rather than give such powers to 
councils themselves, highlights the issue.
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